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1 ABSTRACT 
The ability to achieve representational insight in the sense that a subject 
is able to form associations between certain features of a real object and to 
transfer those associations to a picture of that object is cognitively quite 
demanding. So far, there is only little evidence for this ability in animals, which 
is, at least in part, due to a lack of appropriate testing methods. An innovative 
approach (Complementary Information Procedure; CIP) that allows for 
distinguishing between representational insight and less advanced mechanisms 
of picture-object recognition was recently introduced by Aust and Huber (2006). 
There, pigeons which were highly familiar with humans were trained to learn 
the discrimination between pictures of incomplete human figures (S+) and 
pictures showing something else (S-) and were then tested with parts of the 
human figures that were previously missing as well as with arbitrary patches of 
human skin. The results revealed that the subjects responded significantly more 
to the missing parts than to non-representative skin patches, which suggested 
that they recognized the missing parts as being parts of the human body. It was 
concluded that the pigeons were able of representational insight. It was argued 
that they could have done so only by means of associations between individual 
parts of humans, which were formed through experience with real persons and 
which could then be transferred also to pictures of humans.  
The present study was carried out to further test this familiarity 
assumption. To this end, the experiment by Aust and Huber (2006) was 
replicated with pictures of an object class that was unfamiliar to the pigeons, 
namely snails. For this purpose, pigeons were required to learn the 
discrimination between pictures of incomplete snails (i.e., snails without shells 
or heads; S+) and pictures without snails (S-). Afterwards they were tested with 
the parts of the snails that were missing during training and with arbitrary 
patches of snail skin. In contrast to the study by Aust and Huber the subjects 
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showed no significant difference in responding to missing parts and to arbitrary 
skin patches, indicating that they recognized neither of them as belonging to the 
body of a snail and that they could not discriminate between true object parts 
and non-representative skin patches. It was concluded that this was due to the 
pigeons’ lack of experience with real snails, which made it impossible for the 
birds to gain representational insight. Therefore, the results of the present study 
strengthen the assumption that experience with live instances of a category 
enables pigeons to recognize category members (and their parts) in pictures at a 
level beyond the discrimination of simple perceptual features, and are thus 
further (indirect) evidence of representational insight by this species. 
Furthermore, they confirm the CIP introduced by Aust and Huber as an 
appropriate method of investigating this ability. 
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2 INTRODUCTION 
 
2.1 Pigeon Visual Categorization 
Successful interactions with the enormous quantity of objects existing, 
both animate and inanimate, require an individual to detect, recognize and 
respond to objects in an appropriate manner (Spetch & Friedman, 2006). 
Thereby, the ability to assign objects to categories (e.g., on the basis of 
similarity) allows for notable reductions in cognitive demand by simplifying the 
complex and changing environment subjects are faced with (Zayan & Vauclair, 
1998). “Similarity” may thereby be based on common perceptual features, on a 
common function, or on a logical relation between stimuli or classes 
(Herrnstein, 1990). In other words, categorization means to treat similar, but not 
identical things, as being equivalent by sorting them into the same category and 
by responding to them in the same or in a similar way (e.g., Herrnstein, 1984; 
Huber, 2001).  
An early, influential demonstration of pigeons´ ability to sort stimuli was 
the pioneering study by Herrnstein and Loveland (1964), in which pigeons were 
trained to discriminate between photographs containing at least one human 
being and photographs without humans. If the presented picture contained a 
human, the pigeons were rewarded for pecking a key; if the picture did not 
contain a human, pecks were not rewarded. The pigeons readily learned the 
discrimination and also generalized to novel slides. All together, the birds 
succeeded in detecting human beings in photographs constituting “a class of 
visual stimuli so diverse that it precludes simple characterization” (Herrnstein & 
Loveland, 1964, p. 549). 
Perceptual categories are often referred to as being “open-ended” as the 
number of possible class-members is potentially unlimited (Herrnstein, 1964). 
There is substantial evidence of pigeons´ ability to classify visual stimuli 
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according to perceptual similarity (e.g., Aust & Huber, 2001; 2002; 2003; Cerella, 
1979; Delius, 1992; Huber, 2001; Huber et al., 2000; Huber & Aust, 2006; 
Lazareva et al., 2004; 2006; Yamazaki et al., 2007). These as well as many other 
studies showed that pigeons were not only able to discriminate between 
different categories but that they could also generalize a learned discrimination 
to novel class members. These demonstrations also revealed that learning about 
and forming a perceptual category, respectively, was not restricted to stimuli 
which the pigeons were likely to be familiar with, i.e., stimuli from their natural 
environment, but that this ability also extended to stimuli that the pigeons had 
most probably never seen before in their lives, like underwater pictures of fish 
(Herrnstein & de Villiers, 1980). 
 
2.2 Picture-Object Recognition 
2.2.1 The Problem of Picture-Object Recognition  
One of the basic issues relating to the study of both human and animal 
visual cognition concerns the use of symbolic instead of real objects, like 
pictures, maps or scale models. Pictures in particular have become one of the 
most favored types of experimental stimuli. Compared to more simple artificial 
stimuli, like geometrical forms, pictures share many characteristics with the real 
objects they depict. Therefore, they are ecologically more valid. There are many 
studies in which the experimenters made use of pictorial stimuli such as colored 
slides or photographs on the assumption that the animal makes some link 
between them and the real-world stimulus that is represented (e.g., Candland, 
1969; Bruce, 1982; Brown and Dooling, 1992). However, successful 
categorization does not necessarily mean that a subject also understands what a 
pictorial stimulus actually represents. The question is, whether animals, just like 
humans, can recognize the relation between 2D-pictures and their 3D-referents. 
Are non-human animals capable of picture-object recognition in this way?  
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Even in humans, the recognition of photographs or pictures is not as 
obvious as one might think (Slater et al., 1984; Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al., 
1997; Bovet & Vauclair, 2000). In cross-cultural studies it has been shown that 
people who had never seen two-dimensional representations had difficulties 
recognizing pictures (Miller, 1973). In fact, they needed some exposition to and 
experience with them before they were capable of perceiving what they showed 
(Deregowski, 1989; Miller, 1973).  
Regarding pigeons, one has to keep in mind that they have huge visual 
memory capacities (Cook et al., 2005; Fagot & Cook, 2006; Vaughan and Greene, 
1984; von Fersen & Delius, 1989). As they are able to store large numbers of 
visual images they may have solved by rote learning at least some of the tasks 
that had initially been interpreted in terms of representational insight. 
Alternatively, they may have formed categories by extracting an array of 
category-defining features and combining them into a perceptual class rule. 
Indeed, both mechanisms (rote learning and learning of a perceptual class rule) 
may allow for generalization to novel instances of a learnt category without 
recognition of the link between a photograph and the real world being required 
(Lea, 1984). 
Generally, it has to be considered that pictures are always abstractions, 
i.e., simplifications, of the real objects they portray. In other words, they always 
entail a reduction in the informational content compared to the real object 
(Bovet & Vauclair, 2000). They fail to display various properties that facilitate or 
even make possible the recognition of real things, like 3D-cues, motion, 
auditory and olfactory cues (Bovet & Vauclair, 2000; Delius et al., 2000; Fagot et 
al., 2000). Furthermore, pictorial stimuli are always reduced along physical 
dimensions, such as size (most of the time), color and stereoscopic as well as 
motion parallax cues that are necessary for perceiving depth (Bovet & Vauclair, 
2000). Also, pictures misrepresent the real world due to technical shortcomings, 
for instance poor luminous and chromatic replication, flicker etc. (Bovet & 
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Vauclair, 2000; Delius et al., 2000). Finally, pictures (both photographs and 
stimuli presented on computer screens) are usually adapted to human vision. 
As a result, they often lack some critical features of the vision of other species 
(e.g., UV-light for birds) and therefore offer false color representations. In 
contrast to the trichromatic visual system of humans, pigeons are capable of 
tetrachromatic or even pentachromatic vision. Therefore, they are able to 
distinguish color qualities that humans are not able to detect (Delius, 2000). As 
a consequence of all these factors, pictures may appear quite differently to a 
pigeon from real objects. It is very important to be aware that we can´t tell what 
a nonhuman subject actually perceives when it looks at a picture, and we can’t 
take for granted that it will comprehend what a picture actually shows. 
 
2.2.2 Levels of Picture-Object Recognition 
There are different stages regarding the mechanisms by which an animal 
may recognize the relation between an object and its picture, i.e., establish 
picture-object correspondence. 
(1) Perceptual level. The first and cognitively least demanding level is that 
of recognizing the perceptual properties of an object, i.e., the subject simply 
needs to discriminate one or more visual features on the picture and recognize 
them in the real object (or vice versa). Positive transfer is thereby mediated by 
simple invariant 2D-characteristics, which are visible in both the picture and the 
object. Therefore, transfer does not necessarily mean that the subject recognized 
the 2D-picture as equivalent to the real 3D-object. A characteristic patch, visible 
in both an object and its picture, may, for example, be sufficient for recognition 
without any comprehension of the pictures´ representational nature.  
(2) Associative level. At the next level there is the ability to recognize the 
associations between certain features (or parts) of an object and to transfer these 
associations to pictures of that object (or vice versa). This would still not imply 
that a subject understands the pictures´ representational nature in the strictest 
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sense, but would go beyond simple discrimination of individual 2D-features. 
Through my thesis I will use the term “representational insight” in this sense. 
(3) Abstract level. The most abstract and cognitively most demanding 
level is that of “true” representational insight. This is the ability to understand 
that pictures are entities that “stand for something other than themselves” 
(DeLoache, 1995; 2000), i.e., to evaluate them as representations of the real 
world. This requires achieving a dual representation, as pictures have a 
concrete as well as an abstract nature. It is thus necessary to represent them as 
real entities and at the same time, represent their abstract relation to their 
referents (DeLoache, 2000; Ittelson, 1996). At the same time, a subject must not 
confuse the picture with the real object (Parron et al., 2008) as this would mean 
that the object and the picture are processed in exactly the same way, with no 
distinction between the two being made. The picture would then be recognized 
as being the same as the object (Fagot, 1999). True representational insight, by 
contrast, requires a subject to be aware of the fact that the picture is different 
from the real object. It has to understand that the picture is a representation of 
the object but not the object itself. In this case, the processing of the picture is 
independent of the processing of the actual object (Fagot, 1999). 
Representational insight in its strictest sense is therefore the most advanced 
mechanism of establishing picture-object correspondence. 
 
2.2.3 Methods of Investigating Picture-Object Recognition 
The question of picture-object recognition is usually addressed by means 
of two main types of approaches. One approach is to test if an animal shows 
adapted behaviour to pictorial representations of 3D-objects. This could, for 
example, be social behaviour towards pictures of conspecifics (e.g., Shimizu, 
1998), fear in the presence of threatening stimuli (e.g., Vandenheede & 
Bouissou, 1995), or predator behaviour with pictures of prey (e.g., Clark & Uetz, 
1990). However, such behaviour could also be elicited by simple 2D-features 
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common to the picture and the real object, i.e., successful generalization does 
not necessarily require the ability to recognize the correspondence between a 
picture and its object (Spetch & Friedmann, 2006). Also, display of adapted 
behaviour does not rule out the possibility of picture-object confusion. 
The other approach to examine picture-object recognition is that of 
testing for transfer of discrimination from real objects to pictures, or vice versa (e.g., 
Bovet & Vauclair, 1998; Cabe, 1976; Delius, 1992; Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1980; 
Spetch & Friedmann, 2006; Truppa et al., 2009; Watanabe, 1993, 1997a). This 
means that an animal is trained to discriminate between real objects and is then 
tested with pictures of those objects, or it is trained to discriminate between 
pictures of objects and is then tested with their real 3D-referents. Very rarely, 
however, have such experiments allowed defining the cognitive strategy by 
which transfer was accomplished (Aust & Huber, 2006). In most studies 
mentioned until now, the presented pictures contained some of the same 
perceptual features as the real objects they portrayed. Thus, it was almost 
impossible to tell how and at which cognitive level the pictures were processed. 
In particular, it could not be decided whether transfer occurred on a merely 
perceptual basis due to the recognition of some invariant 2D-features, at the 
associative level due to transfer of learned associations, or at the most abstract 
level, due to true representational insight. Until now, there are only a few 
studies that really tried to overcome the problem of common perceptual 
features in objects and pictures.  
One example is provided by Watanabe (1997a), who trained pigeons on 
two discrimination tasks. Stimuli were edible and inedible objects as well as 
pictures of them. One group of pigeons had to discriminate between real objects 
and their photographs (regardless whether the stimuli were edible or not), i.e., 
they had to sort them into a “real object” and a “photograph” category. The 
other group had to discriminate between edible and inedible items (regardless 
whether the stimuli were real objects or pictures), i.e., they had to sort the 
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stimuli into the categories “edible” and “inedible”. The pigeons of both groups 
learned the discrimination and also showed transfer to novel stimuli. The 
author suggested that these results demonstrated that the pigeons were able to 
classify the stimuli according to the category rule “edible/inedible”, but were 
also able to distinguish between real objects and pictures. Therefore, he 
concluded that pigeons can recognize pictures as representations of real objects. 
Another experiment was conducted by Dasser (1987) who found that 
long-tailed macaques recognized the identity of group members presented on 
color slides. After training on few examples, the subjects correctly identified 
novel views of the animals shown in training. It was suggested that slides of 
group members could be used as representations of monkeys individually 
known to the subjects.  
A more recent study was carried out by Aust and Huber in 2006, in 
which they introduced an approach called Complementary Information Procedure 
(CIP). This procedure is different from other testing procedures in the sense that 
it actually allows for disentangling the role of perceptual and cognitive factors. 
In this case, the possibility of stimulus generalization by means of simple 
perceptual features is widely ruled out. The subjects are first trained to 
discriminate between pictures that show a particular incomplete target object 
(S+) and pictures that show something else (S-). Once the subjects have learned 
the discrimination they are tested with three novel types of pictures. The first 
type shows a part of the picture that has been present in the training stimuli 
(seen part; SP), to see if the subjects are basically able to recognize isolated parts 
of the objects. The pictures of the second type show the previously missing part 
(unseen part; UP). As the training and the UP test stimuli do not include the 
same parts of the target objects, but instead provide complementary 
information, transfer cannot be based on the recognition of simple item-specific 
perceptual features present in both training and test stimuli (e.g., salient shapes 
or patches of characteristic texture). To control for transfer by means of 
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category-specific features the subjects are also tested with a third type of 
pictures showing “non-parts”, which are patches of arbitrary shape and size 
that contain similar surface properties as “true” parts. Poorer transfer to non-
parts than to true complementary parts would indicate an ability to perceive the 
correspondence between pictures and their 3D-referents at a level beyond the 
recognition of some simple category-specific features (Aust & Huber, 2006). 
Aust and Huber (2006) trained two groups of pigeons to discriminate 
between pictures of incomplete human figures (Class P) and pictures that were 
devoid of humans (Class NP). All birds were highly familiar with humans as 
they saw keepers, experimenters, students and/or visitors almost every day. 
The pigeons were divided into two groups: Group No Hands, in which the 
humans on the pictures were devoid of hands and Group No Head, in which 
the depicted humans were devoid of heads. After successful discrimination the 
pigeons were tested with SP stimuli, i.e., heads for Group No Hands and hands 
for Group No Head, UP stimuli, i.e., hands for Group No Hands and heads for 
Group No Head and skin stimuli (SK), i.e., patches of human skin of arbitrary 
size and shape.  
Most importantly, the pigeons responded significantly less to the non-
representative skin stimuli (SK) than to the true complementary parts (UP), 
while peck rates on SP and UP stimuli did not differ significantly from each 
other. The authors concluded that the pigeons recognized the true missing parts 
but not the skin patches as belonging to the human figure. Thereby, the birds 
must have drawn on their experience with real humans and their parts because 
they had never seen any 2D-representations of the unseen parts during training 
but could nevertheless classify them as belonging to Class P. It was concluded 
that the pigeons must have recognized the correspondence between the 
(incomplete) human figures depicted in the training stimuli and live human 
beings (and between pictures of the missing parts and real body parts). In 
summary, the authors claimed that the pigeons had not relied on any simple 
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2D-features present in both training and test stimuli but that responding had 
mainly been based on representational insight and that perceptual features, like 
the skin color, played an accessory role at best (see also Aust & Huber, in press). 
Nevertheless, the authors acknowledged that transfer could have been 
achieved through learning about the associations of the individual parts of an 
object through real-life experience which were then recognized in pictures of 
this object. In other words, transfer was accomplished by a mechanism beyond 
simple feature discrimination, but the pigeons may not necessarily have fully 
understood the representational nature of the pictures. Thus, the CIP cannot 
distinguish between the associative level and the most abstract level of 
representational insight in its strictest sense, but is an appropriate tool for 
disentangling these two from simple feature discrimination. 
In a follow-up study Aust and Huber (2010) replicated their experiment 
with pigeons that had extensive experience with live human beings 
(“Unrestricted” pigeons) as well as with pigeons that had never seen human 
heads (“Restricted” pigeons). Half of the birds of each condition were assigned 
to Group No Hands, the others were assigned to Group No Head. The rationale 
was that if the pigeons simply relied on spurious perceptual features in the 
pictures, there should be no difference in the responses between “Restricted” 
and “Unrestricted” pigeons. If however, the pigeons were capable of 
representational insight the birds of Group Restricted No Head, which had no 
visual pre-experience with real-life referents of the “unseen parts”, should be 
unable to perceive the UP stimuli as representations of real body parts. Thus, 
these would be the only pigeons that should fail to prefer UP over SK stimuli, 
while the three other groups should do so (Groups Unrestricted No Hands; 
Unrestricted No Head; Restricted No Hands). Indeed, the results showed that 
the birds of Group Restricted No Head did not respond differently to UP and to 
SK stimuli, as was the case in all other groups. Therefore, the authors suggested 
that the successful groups could solve the task because of their experience with 
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live hands and heads, respectively, whereas this was impossible for Group 
Restricted No Head, as these birds had never seen any real human heads 
before. In summary, this study confirmed the conclusions of the previous one 
(Aust & Huber, 2006), namely, that pigeons can recognize the relation between 
pictures and their referents not just by means of simple perceptual features 
presented in both an object and its picture, but that they can indeed base their 
responding on representational insight (at least at the associative level). In 
particular, the second study complemented the first in demonstrating the 
crucial role of experience with real-life representatives of a category as a 
prerequisite for understanding the correspondence between pictures and 
objects. 
These findings are in line with the results of earlier studies that 
illustrated the importance of experience for picture-object recognition. One 
example was provided by Watanabe (1997b). He trained two groups of pigeons 
in a discrimination task to peck on a TV screen when a feeder or a coffee mug, 
respectively, appeared. The feeder was considered to be a “familiar object” 
whereas the mug was an “unfamiliar object”. After training, the pigeons were 
tested with images of unusual views of those objects. Pigeons trained with the 
“familiar object” showed generalization to the new views, whereas pigeons 
trained with the “unfamiliar object” failed to solve the task. The author 
concluded that experience with real objects, as it was the case for the feeder, 
facilitated object-picture recognition. 
 Truppa et al. (2008) found similar results in the tufted capuchin 
monkeys. The monkeys were first trained to discriminate 3D-objects and then 
tested if they could match the objects with their color photographs. Then they 
were trained to discriminate color photographs of new 3D-objects and were 
subsequently tested for their ability to match these with the real objects. The 
monkeys were able to match familiar objects with their color photographs, but 
showed poorer performance in the Picture-to-Object Test. It was concluded that 
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the acquired familiarity with the real objects in the first part of the experiment 
may have facilitated object-to-picture transfer during testing, whereas the lack 
of previous visual exposure to the real objects in the second part might have 
impeded picture-to-object transfer. This suggests that familiarity with real 
objects plays an important role in the ability to associate them with pictures 
thereof. 
 
2.3 Aim of the Study 
My study investigated whether pigeons would behave differently if 
trained and tested in the same way as the ones in Aust and Huber (2006), but 
with pictures of a category that they had no prior experience with. If, indeed, 
the pigeons in the “human”-study responded differently to UP and SK stimuli 
because of their experience with live humans (i.e., representational insight), no 
differences in peck rates between unseen parts and non-representative stimuli 
should occur in an experiment where real-life experience is missing, as neither 
type would be recognized as being representative. In other words, pigeons 
trained on pictures of objects of an unfamiliar category should fail to classify 
“true” complementary parts (UP) as class members and should not respond 
differently to UP stimuli and arbitrary, non-representative stimuli — just like it 
was the case for the pigeons in Group Restricted No Head in Aust and Huber 
(2010). If, however, the pigeons responded more to the unseen parts than to 
arbitrary patches, just like the birds in Aust and Huber (2006), this would 
question any conclusions in terms of representational insight that were made in 
that previous study. Instead, other mechanisms of responding, like, e.g., 
strategies based on perceptual feature detection, would then have to be 
considered. Alternatively, similar outcomes in the two studies may indicate that 
the results obtained by Aust and Huber were an artifact of some 
methodological flaws. Hence, a secondary aim of my study was to check if the 
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Complementary Information Procedure (CIP) is indeed a reliable method to 
investigate picture-object recognition in pigeons. 
Choosing a category unknown to the pigeons needed some 
considerations, as category members should fulfill some major criteria. First, 
they should bear some reasonable degree of overall perceptual similarity to 
each other; second, they should possess well-distinguishable parts, such as 
“heads”, and third, they should not bear strong similarities with members of 
familiar categories in order to reduce transfer by between-category 
generalization. I eventually decided to use “snails” as the category to be tested, 
as this seemed to fulfill all these criteria. I used the same design and stimulus 
generation techniques as Aust and Huber (2006), which allowed maximum 
comparability of the results and also provided a straightforward way to control 
for any artifacts that may have contributed to the results of Aust and Huber 
(2006). 
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3 METHODS 
 
3.1 Subjects and Housing 
Eight adult pigeons (Columba livia) were used in this experiment. Seven 
of them were homing pigeons, one was of a local Austrian race, called Strasser. 
The birds were housed in four outdoor aviary compartments (each measuring  
3 m x 1.1 m x 3 m), together with 10-14 conspecifics of mixed sex and breed. 
Five of the homing pigeons lived together in Aviary 1 (Cordula, Franz, Josef, 
Klara and Herbert), one lived in Aviary 4 (Bobbison) and one in Aviary 6 
(Daisy). The Strasser pigeon (Verena) lived in Aviary 5. 
Five pigeons had several years of experience with visual discrimination 
tasks at the onset of the experiment, but they were all naive to the present task. 
For three pigeons (Bobbison, Daisy and Verena) it was the first time they 
participated in a visual discrimination task. For this reason they had to get 
familiarized with the experimental set-up and the procedure prior to the 
experiment.  
On testing days, subjects were fed a small amount of food (mixed grain) 
after experimental sessions in addition to the food they got as a reward during 
testing. On nontesting days, the pigeons were supplied with extra rations of 
mixed grain. Water and grit were freely available in the aviaries at any time. 
 
3.2 Apparatus 
The pigeons were trained and tested in wooden experimental chambers 
(“Skinner-boxes”; see Figure 1) which they entered from their respective 
outdoor compartments through a connecting channel. This special housing 
technique was introduced by Huber (1994). The interior size of the boxes was  
50 x 30 x 40 cm. The frontal wall of the chamber was constituted by a 15.0” XGA 
Color TFT-LCD monitor (resolution = 1024 x 768 pixels) mounted behind an 
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infrared touchframe (CarrollTouch by Elo). In front of the screen there was an 
“intelligence panel” with a clear perspex pecking key in its center. Stimuli were 
presented on the LCD monitor, at a distance of 5 cm behind the pecking key. 
Food reward was administered by means of a special feeder, the “grain lifter”. 
It consisted of an electric motor that lifted a piston with a depression on top up 
through a food reservoir. Thereby, grain was accumulated in the depression. 
The piston was then lifted through a hole in the bottom of the testing chamber 
and the grain became accessible to the pigeon directly below the touchscreen. A 
hopper light illuminated the top of the piston whenever grain was accessible. 
Data acquisition and device control were handled with hard- and software 
especially developed for the requirements of learning experiments with 
animals, especially pigeons. The presentation computer (Embedded CLab E2,  
 M. Steurer) incorporated a personal computer that ran the experimental 
software (CognitionLabLight,  M. Steurer), the device electronics, and the 
power supply for controlling the feeder motor. All boxes were equipped with a 
video surveillance system so that the birds’ activities could be observed on a 
control screen. Furthermore, a Virtual Network Computing server (VNC) was 
installed on every presentation computer. VNC is a graphical desktop sharing 
system that allows to remotely control other computers. This enabled me to 
track the experimental sessions on the control monitor via VNC client.  
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Figure 1. Experimental chamber including the pecking key and the feeder outlet. On 
positive trials, responses to the pecking key activate the feeder and the pigeon is 
allowed to feed for a pre-specified time period. 
 
3.3 Stimuli  
The stimuli were color photographs taken from different online 
databases (http://www.photodisc.com, http://www.freedigitalphotos.net, 
http://bayimages.net, http://www.acclaimimages.com). Positive pictures (S+) 
showed one or more snails (Class Snails, S), negative pictures (S-) showed 
something else (Class No Snails, NS). Examples of the training stimuli are 
shown in Figure 2 (see also Appendix, Figures A1-A3). It is worth noting that 
the backgrounds of the pictures were similar in both classes (i.e., also the 
pictures of Class NS showed sceneries where snails were likely to occur). 
Furthermore, I also ensured that positive and negative stimuli included similar 
colors and shapes in order to prevent the subjects from using a learning strategy 
based on memorization of conspicuous spurious background features or 
particular colors. The subjects were arbitrarily assigned to either of two 
experimental groups, each consisting of 4 birds (see Table 1).  
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Table 1. Subjects and assignment to groups 
Group No Shell Group No Head 
Bobbison Cordula 
Josef Daisy 
Klara Franz 
Verena Herbert 
 
For Group No Shell, the training stimuli shown in Class S were devoid of 
the snail´s shell. Hence, only the body of the snail (including the head) was 
shown. In Group No Head, the training stimuli shown in Class S were devoid 
of the snail´s head. Hence, only the headless body and the shell were shown. 
The photographs were adapted to the demands of the present task in 
Photoshop 7.0. I created the stimuli of Class S by digitally removing the critical 
part or by choosing cutouts that did not include the respective snail part. Also 
the stimuli of Class NS were digitally manipulated, e.g., by removing or 
covering parts of depicted (non-snail) figures or objects in order to prevent any 
artifacts possibly brought in by such manipulations from occurring in just one 
class. 
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Figure 2. Examples of the training stimuli for both groups. a) Examples of S+ stimuli 
of Group No Head; b) Examples of S+ stimuli of Group No Shell; c) Examples of S- 
stimuli, which were the same for both groups. 
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I left the backgrounds unchanged in both classes to keep the stimuli as 
natural as possible and to provide maximum comparability with the study of 
Aust and Huber (2006). The stimuli were presented at a size of 128 x 128 pixels 
and a resolution of 72 dpi, thus producing a 45 x 45 mm picture on the screen. 
The pictures for the subsequent Generalization Test, derived from novel 
images, were created in the same way as the training stimuli (see Appendix, 
Figures A4-A6). The test stimuli for the critical Picture-Object Recognition Test, 
again made from novel pictures, showed just isolated parts of snails, namely 
heads, shells, or arbitrary patches of snail skin. These, as well, were created by 
digitally removing any undesired snail parts or by choosing pictures that           
a priori contained the required parts (e.g., pictures showing just a snail shell). 
Regarding the skin stimuli, half of those pictures were created by digitally 
removing the house and other parts of the snail skin until just an appropriate 
part of skin remained, the other half by pasting cutouts of a novel Class S 
picture onto a novel Class NS picture. Examples of the test stimuli are shown in 
Figure 3 (see also Appendix, Figures A7-A9).  
 21 
 
  
 
Figure 3. Examples of the test stimuli. a) Heads, which were seen parts for Group No 
Shell and unseen parts for Group No Head. b) Shells, which were seen parts for Group 
No Head and unseen parts for Group No Shell. c) Skin patches, which were the same 
for both groups. 
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3.4 Procedure 
The procedure was a standard Go/NoGo-Procedure. A schematic 
overview of the Go/NoGo-Procedure is shown in Figure 4. The pigeons were 
required to peck in the presence of a positive stimulus and to refrain from 
pecking in the presence of a negative stimulus. Pecks were counted throughout 
stimulus presentation, but only pecks emitted during the first 10 s of a trial 
(fixed interval, FI) entered analysis later. During the subsequent variable 
interval (VI, range 1-20 s), it was unimportant whether the pigeons pecked, as 
the function of this was just to prevent the emergence of time patterns. After the 
VI was completed, the decision phase followed. There, the subjects had to 
respond three times within three seconds to receive food reinforcement in 
positive (GO) trials. In negative (NOGO) trials, the subjects had to refrain from 
responding during the decision phase, with each response prolonging stimulus 
presentation. Negative trials were terminated only after no responses had 
occurred within 8 s. No food was delivered on negative trials. The image 
remained visible throughout the entire trial. Each trial was followed by an 
intertrial interval (ITI), a dark phase of 3 s that signaled the forthcoming 
stimulus presentation. Test stimuli were presented with neutral contingencies, 
which means that the respective test trial resulted in neither food access nor a 
delay interval but was terminated after the first 10 s of presentation. 
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Figure 4. Schematic depiction of the Go/NoGo-Procedure (retrieved from 
http://www.pigeon.psy.tufts.edu/avc/print/huber/huber_figprint.htm; Huber, 2001; 
note that in my experiment there was a grain lifter instead of the hopper). The figure 
shows the individual phases of one trial. Important events are indicated by red arrows. 
The time during which a stimulus is present is marked yellow; the time during which 
food is available is marked green. Pecks are indicated by vertical lines above the time 
line. (In this example, four pecks would have been recorded in the first 10 seconds of 
presentation.)  
 
Each bird accomplished one session a day, 5 days a week, with each 
session consisting of the presentation of 40 stimuli, 20 positive (Class S) and     
20 negative ones (Class NS). The sequences were presented quasi-randomly, 
which means that they never contained more than 3 positive or negative stimuli 
in immediate succession, and that the first stimulus of each session was always 
a positive one.  
At the onset of each session a so-called starter stimulus (a colored square) 
was presented. The same starter stimulus was used for the pre-training and for 
the experimental phase. The starter stimulus was introduced in order to make 
sure that the subject was attentive to the task, no matter if the first stimulus of a 
session was positive or negative. (The latter could happen if a session had to be 
aborted due to motivational problems of the subject and was continued the next 
day at the point where it had been stopped).  
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3.5 Experimental Phases 
 
3.5.1 Pre-Training 
In order to familiarize the subjects (especially the naive ones) with the 
procedure, they were subjected to a pre-training phase. To make sure that all 
pigeons worked equally well before the onset of the discrimination training, all 
of them (including the experienced ones as some of them had been out of 
practice for a while) had to do the pre-training. The stimuli used for pre-
training were irrelevant to the actual experiment. The pigeons were first trained 
in an autoshaping procedure, which means that a stimulus (a colored square) 
was presented for 10 s, followed by 5 s food access and illumination of the 
feeder, no matter if the pigeons had pecked at the stimulus or not. But if they 
pecked, presentation was immediately terminated and food was delivered. 
Each autoshaping session consisted of 40 trials.  
When the subjects started to respond to the stimulus, autoshaping was 
terminated and peck-training started. There, the pigeons had to peck in 
response to the same stimulus 3 times within 3 seconds to receive food from the 
feeder. Again, each session consisted of 40 trials. The next step was a simple 
discrimination training between two different stimuli – the positive one was 
that from the prior pre-training phases (the colored square), the negative one 
was a new one (a differently colored square). When the pigeons had learned to 
discriminate these two stimuli they got further training with eight additional 
new stimuli (again differently colored squares), four positive and four negative 
ones. Thus, they had learned to discriminate between 5 positive and 5 negative 
stimuli in total by the end of pre-training.  
 
3.5.2 Discrimination Training 
The subjects were then assigned to the two training groups (Group No 
Shell and Group No Head) and were trained to discriminate between pictures 
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containing (incomplete) snails (Class S) and pictures showing something else 
(Class NS). Training consisted of the presentation of 200 stimuli, 100 of Class S 
and 100 of Class NS. The stimuli were organized into five sets of 40 stimuli 
each, with one set per session being shown. Completion of all five sets (or 
sessions) was considered a “cycle”. I created ten cycles in total, which differed 
from one another by the order of stimuli within each set and by the order of sets 
within each cycle. Training was terminated as soon as the subjects 
discriminated between positive and negative stimuli at a significant level in all 
five sessions of such a cycle (see Data Analysis). If a pigeon failed to learn the 
task within 100 sessions, it was discontinued. 
 
3.5.3 Generalization Test 
In a subsequent Generalization Test (Generalization Test I), I presented 
80 novel non-reinforced stimuli, 40 of Class S and 40 of Class NS, to make sure 
that discrimination was due to mechanisms beyond rote learning on a pixel-by-
pixel basis. Each test session consisted of 32 training stimuli and 8 test stimuli, 
and the latter were randomly interspersed into the sequence of training stimuli. 
The test stimuli were shown with neutral contingencies (i.e., they were shown 
for 10 s and afterwards disappeared no matter if the pigeon pecked or not). The 
training stimuli were reinforced in the same way as in training (i.e., pecks on 
positive stimuli were rewarded while pecks on negative stimuli resulted in a 
delay). Subjects which were not able to discriminate significantly between the 
novel instances of the training classes got additional training after 
Generalization Test I. Therefore, I conducted another training phase of at least 
10 sessions to further increase the birds’ experience with the training categories 
and thereby maybe enable them to eventually grasp the underlying class rule. 
Then they were subjected to a second run of the Generalization Test 
(Generalization Test II). As the test stimuli were shown with neutral 
contingencies in the first run the same pictures could be used again in the 
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second run, because one-trial-learning during the first run was not possible. 
Only if a subject was able to pass the Generalization Test (either I or II) it was 
subjected to the subsequent Picture-Object Recognition Test. 
 
3.5.4 Picture-Object Recognition Test  
The Picture-Object Recognition Test was the critical test of the present 
experiment. It entailed three types of novel non-reinforced stimuli, with each 
type comprising 40 pictures. All test stimuli were derived from new pictures. 
Stimuli of the first type (seen part; SP) showed a snail part that had been 
present in the training stimuli of the respective group (and absent from the 
stimuli of the opposite group), namely heads for Group No Shell and shells for 
Group No Head. Those stimuli served mainly as a control. Namely, I wanted to 
make sure that the pigeons had no general problem classifying pictures that 
showed only isolated snail parts. Stimuli of the second type (unseen part; UP) 
showed the part of the snail that had not been present in the training stimuli of 
the respective group (but was present in the stimuli of the opposite group), that 
is, shells for Group No Shell and heads for Group No Head. As training 
instances of Class S and UP stimuli did not contain the same perceptual 
information but were complementary, transfer to the latter could not be based 
on the recognition of item-specific features, that is, idiosyncratic stimulus 
aspects that are used to identify particular instances but are irrelevant to 
categorization (Loidolt, Aust, Meran & Huber, 2003), such as, e.g., salient 
shapes. Furthermore, as none of the depicted parts shown in the test matched 
any particular snail presented during training, transfer by means of item-
specific features that appeared in different body parts of any individual snail 
(such as, e.g., particularities of a specific snail´s skin texture) could also be ruled 
out as a basis of transfer. To control for transfer by means of category-specific 
features, that is, class-distinguishing stimulus aspects (most likely surface 
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properties related to snail skin), I introduced a third test stimulus type (skin; 
SK), which showed patches of snail skin of arbitrary shape and size.  
Like in the Generalization Test each test session involved 32 training 
stimuli with 8 interspersed test stimuli. The whole test thus consisted of 15 
sessions. The test stimuli were randomly assigned to the individual sessions, 
with the restriction that each session included stimuli of all three types. To give 
a better impression of how a test session looked like, numbers of stimuli as well 
as sample pictures are shown for each group in Figure 5.  
 
 
Group  
No Head 
Group  
No Shell 
Number of Stimuli 
per Test Session 
Group  
No Head 
Group  
No Shell 
Training Stimuli   
 
  
32 32 
Test Stimuli 8 Test Stimuli in total 
Seen part 
  
2 - 3 2 - 3 
Unseen part 
  
2 - 3 2 - 3 
Skin 
  
2 - 3 2 - 3 
Figure 5. Design of the test sessions in the Picure-Object Recognition Test, shown 
separately for the two groups. For Group No Head, the shells served as seen parts and 
the heads served as unseen parts, and vice versa for Group No Shell. Skin stimuli were 
the same for both groups. 
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3.6 Data Analysis 
For statistical analysis I made use of the program Data Desk 6.0. Training 
performance was assessed as rho-values, a measure introduced by Herrnstein et 
al. (1976). It is derived from the U statistic (by using the non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U Test) and gives the probability of an average positive picture being 
ranked above an average negative picture. When rho is 0,5, discrimination is 
absent; and when rho is 1,0, discrimination is perfect. With 20 positive and       
20 negative stimuli, a rho of 0,676 indicates that discrimination is significant 
correct at the 5%-level (obtained from http://www.pigeon.psy.tufts.edu/ 
avc/huber/Rho.htm). To reach criterion in the discrimination training, the 
subjects had to discriminate between positive and negative stimuli at a 
significant level (rho = 0,676) in all five sessions of a cycle. 
All other analyses were based on mean standardized response rates that 
were obtained by dividing the absolute number of pecks emitted in each trial of 
a session (both training and test trials) by the average peck rate of that session, 
as measured on trials with training contingencies only. To ensure that the birds 
really learned the task in the training, i.e., that they grasped the underlying 
class rule, they had to discriminate between positive and negative pictures of 
the Generalization Test significantly with α = 0,01 (rho = 0,651). Good baseline 
performance was necessary to justify any conclusions to be drawn from the 
results of the subsequent Picture-Object Recognition Test. Peck rates in 
response to positive and negative transfer stimuli of the Generalization Test and 
those emitted to SP, UP and SK stimuli of the Picture-Object Recognition Test 
were compared with each other by means of Mann-Whitney U Tests. 
 29 
 
  
4 RESULTS 
 
4.1 Pre-Training 
All subjects readily learned to peck at the stimuli presented on the screen 
and also mastered with ease the subsequent discrimination task with ten 
irrelevant stimuli. Afterwards they were subjected to the training with the snail 
vs. non-snail stimuli. 
 
4.2 Discrimination Training 
The results of the Discrimination Training can be seen in Table 2, which 
shows the rho-values for each cycle and bird. The learning curves for both 
groups are shown in Figure 6. All birds of Group No Head acquired the 
discrimination between the 5th and the 8th cycle. In Group No Shell the fastest 
bird reached criterion in the 9th cycle. Two birds of this group (Bobbison and 
Verena) failed to learn the task within 100 training sessions. For those two birds 
training was terminated and they were excluded from further testing.  
For reasons of comparison Figure 7 shows the learning curves for the 
pigeons of the study by Aust and Huber (2006) where they had to discriminate 
between pictures showing incomplete humans and pictures showing something 
else. The humans presented to Group No Head were devoid of heads, the 
humans shown to Group No Hands were devoid of hands. All birds acquired 
the initial discrimination between the 4th and the 9th cycle. 
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Table 2. Mean rho-values (averaged across the five sessions of a cycle) reached in each 
training cycle by the individual birds. Significant values are in italics and highlighted 
yellow. The birds reached criterion when discriminating at a significant level (rho ≥ 
0,676) in each session of a cycle.  
Cycle Group No Head Group No Shell 
 Daisy Cordula Franz Herbert Josef Klara Bobbison Verena 
1 0,550 0,595 0,613 0,513 0,502 0,509 0,475 0,558 
2 0,717 0,579 0,781 0,602 0,627 0,630 0,519 0,564 
3 0,677 0,427 0,674 0,626 0,502 0,646 0,593 0,560 
4 0,773 0,518 0,483 0,695 0,568 0,612 0,589 0,514 
5 0,846 0,733 0,658 0,631 0,561 0,493 0,536 0,572 
6  0,762 0,716 0,738 0,648 0,709 0,573 0,611 
7   0,735 0,816 0,706 0,706 0,678 0,542 
8    0,798 0,732 0,586 0,582 0,659 
9     0,743 0,587 0,646 0,679 
10      0,633 0,690 0,636 
11      0,625 0,652 0,645 
12      0,590 0,691 0,647 
13      0,733 0,494 0,696 
14       0,572 0,667 
15       0,637 0,609 
16       0,526 0,603 
17       0,589 0,585 
18       0,672 0,638 
19       0,601 0,698 
20       0,624 0,624 
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Figure 6. Acquisition performance of the individual subjects of Groups No Head (A) 
and No Shell (B), shown as rho-values. The dashed horizontal line indicates the limit of 
significance (rho = 0,676). Each cycle consisted of five sessions. 
 
A 
B 
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Figure 7. Acquisition performance of the individual subjects of Groups No Hands (A) 
and No Head (B) of Aust and Huber (2006), shown as rho-values. The dashed 
horizontal line indicates the limit of significance (rho = 0,676). Each cycle consisted of 
five sessions. 
 
The results of the discrimination training for the two groups of the 
present study are summarized in Figure 8, which shows the number (±SD) of 
A 
B 
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sessions needed to reach criterion, averaged across subjects. Interestingly, 
learning speed differed significantly between the two groups (Mann-Whitney-U 
Test; p = 0,0202). Group No Head required 32 (±6) sessions (range 25-40) to 
reach criterion, whereas Group No Shell needed more than twice as many 
sessions, namely 77 (±27), but with large variations among subjects (range 45-
100). (And note that two birds of this group did not reach criterion within 100 
sessions at all). The comparison between Group No Head and just the two 
successful birds of Group No Shell (striped bar) still indicates a tendency for the 
birds of Group No Shell to have been the faster ones (although the small n of 2 
did not allow for a statistical test to confirm this). 
 
 
Figure 8. Mean number (±SD) of sessions needed to reach criterion (or until training 
was aborted), shown separately for Groups No Head (blue bar; n = 4) and No Shell (red 
bar; n = 4). Performance of the two successful birds of Group No Shell (i.e., excluding 
the data of the two subjects that were discontinued after 100 sessions without learning) 
is illustrated by an additional (striped) bar. Means were taken across the subjects of 
each group. 
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4.3 Generalization Test 
Six subjects out of eight learned the discrimination task and were then 
tested with 80 novel non-reinforced stimuli, 40 of Class S and 40 of Class NS 
(Generalization Test I). The results are summarized in Figure 9 which shows 
separately for each group performance of all subjects as mean standardized 
response rates. Peck rates beyond average (> 1) indicate that the pictures were 
treated as positives rather than as negatives; peck rates below average (< 1) 
indicate that the pictures were treated as negatives rather than as positives. 
 
 
Figure 9. Results of Generalization Test I. Performance is shown separately for the 
birds of the two groups as mean standardized response rates (±SD). gen- = novel 
negative stimuli (Class No Snail; NS), gen+ = novel positive stimuli (Class Snail; S). The 
dashed horizontal line indicates the average response level. 
 
All birds showed a tendency to peck more at novel positives than at 
novel negatives in the Generalization Test, but with standard deviations being 
very high, i.e., with a large variability of pecking responses between the stimuli 
of each class. Actually, only Daisy managed to discriminate the test stimuli at a 
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significant level (p = 0,0001). Due to my failure (the test cycle of Herbert only 
contained five sessions instead of ten), statistical analysis concerning Herbert 
was only done for five sessions, but within these, he, as well, failed to 
discriminate significantly. I repeated the Generalization Test (Generalization 
Test II) for all subjects except Daisy after some additional training (see 
Methods). The results of this test are illustrated in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. Results of Generalization Test II. Performance is shown separately for the 
birds of the two groups as mean standardized response rates (±SD). gen- = novel 
negative stimuli (Class No Snail; NS), gen+ = novel positive stimuli (Class Snail; S). The 
dashed horizontal line indicates the average response level. 
 
As revealed by Mann-Whitney U Tests, there was one more bird, Josef, 
who now managed to generalize significantly to novel instances of the training 
classes (p = 0,0092). Similar as in Generalization Test I, a (non-significant) 
tendency to peck more on positive than on negative stimuli could be observed 
in all other birds. Table 3 summarizes the results of the first and the second 
Generalization Test as mean standardized response rates, as well as the results 
 36 
 
  
of the Mann-Whitney U Tests comparing performance between the positive and 
negative transfer stimuli (for the corresponding results obtained by Aust and 
Huber in 2006 see Appendix, Table 6). 
 
Table 3. Results of the two Generalization Tests shown as mean standardized response 
rates separately for each subject (columns gen- and gen+), as well as the results of the 
Mann-Whitney U Tests (columns gen-/gen+; p-values, α = 0,01) comparing performance 
between the positive and the negative test stimuli (significant differences are in italics 
and highlighted yellow). 
Note: gen- = negative transfer stimuli; gen+ = positive transfer stimuli. 
 
Eventually, one subject of each group, Daisy and Josef, had solved the task and 
were subsequently subjected to the Picture-Object Recognition Test. 
 
4.4 Picture-Object Recognition Test 
Presentation of my results as the arithmetic mean of the standardized 
response rates - as was done in Aust and Huber (2006) – was found to convey a 
somewhat misleading picture. Namely, some of the depicted values appeared 
to be in disagreement with the results of the corresponding Mann-Whitney U 
Tests. This was due to wide variations in peck rates within the individual 
stimulus types leading to extreme outliers and large standard deviations. 
Therefore, I decided to illustrate my results not only by means of the arithmetic 
mean (Figure 12; to make them comparable with the data of Aust and Huber), 
but also as box plots, which are based on medians (Figure 11). 
Group Subject 
Generalization Test I Generalization Test II 
gen- gen+ gen-/gen+ gen- gen+ gen-/gen+ 
No Head Cordula 0,733 1,283 0,0214 0,448 0,972 0,0184 
Daisy 0,438 1,191 0,0001    
Franz 0,629 0,925 0,0333 0,670 1,008 0,0626 
Herbert 0,196 0,835 0,4165 0,532 1,063 0,1504 
No Shell Klara 0,769 1,099 0,2263 0,444 1,369 0,0999 
Josef 0,996 1,442 0,2294 0,904 1,489 0,0092 
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The results of the present study are summarized as mean standardized 
response rates in Table 4. Peck rates on the three test stimulus types were 
compared with each other and with performance on the positive and the 
negative generalization test stimuli (Mann-Whitney U Tests; see Table 5). The 
primary focus was thereby with the differences between peck rates in reaction 
to unseen parts versus skin stimuli. (All other comparisons provided 
supplementary information but were nevertheless valuable.) Therefore, analysis 
consisted a priori of eight separate questions. Thus, I did not make any 
Bonferroni corrections, as would have been necessary with tests for the 
existence of any effect of stimulus type at all (Perneger, 1998). To provide a 
direct comparison of my results with the study by Aust and Huber (2006),  
Table 6 shows the results of the Picture-Object Recognition Test obtained in 
their study as mean standardized response rates and Table 7 shows the results 
of the Mann-Whitney U Tests comparing performance on the three test stimulus 
types (p-values; α = 0,05) revealed from their analysis (please see Appendix, 
Supporting Information). 
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Figure 11. Results of the Picture-Object Recognition Test with peck rates on seen parts, 
unseen parts and skin stimuli, shown as box plots. For comparison reasons the results 
of the Generalization Test are shown as well. The dashed horizontal line indicates the 
average level of performance. Each box plot has the following components. The central 
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box depicts the middle half of the data between the 25th and the 75th percentile. The 
horizontal line across the box marks the median, and the shaded area placed 
symmetrically around the median marks the confidence interval. The whiskers 
extending from the top and bottom of the box depict the extent of the main body of the 
data (≤ 1.5 x box length). Extreme data values (≤ 3.0 x box length) are plotted with a 
circle, and very extreme values (i.e., data beyond this limit) are plotted with a starbust. 
Note the extreme outliers that were responsible for the large standard deviations and 
some (apparent) inconsistencies between the columns of Figure 12 (top panel) and the 
corresponding Mann Whitney U Tests. gen- = novel negative stimuli shown in the 
Generalization Test; gen+ = novel positive stimuli shown in the Generalization Test. SP 
= seen part stimuli shown in the Picture-Object Recognition Test; UP = unseen part 
stimuli; SK = skin stimuli. 
 
The main results of the current study can be summarized as follows. 
Most importantly, peck rates to UP and SK stimuli did not significantly differ in 
either bird.  
Josef (Group No Shell) responded more to SP stimuli than to UP and SK 
stimuli and the difference between SP and UP stimuli was even significant (p = 
0,041). This indicates at least some tendency to treat SP stimuli more like 
positives than UP stimuli. Compared to the Generalization Test, there were 
significant differences between the negative test stimuli of the Generalization 
Test and all three test stimulus types of the Picture-Object Recognition Test, and 
this difference was most pronounced for the SP stimuli (see Table 5). No 
significant differences were found between the positive generalization stimuli 
and any of the three test stimulus types of the Picture-Object Recognition Test. 
Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that variations within all the stimulus 
types were high, that peck rates to both UP and SK stimuli were below average 
(< 1) and that the relatively high peck rate to SP stimuli (1,345) was due to just 
one single — extreme — outlier (see Figure 11). Hence, it cannot be concluded 
that Josef treated any type of test stimuli rather as positive than as negative. 
Daisy (Group No Head) showed no significant differences between any 
stimulus types (Table 5). Nevertheless there was at least a weak tendency to 
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respond more to SP than to UP and SK stimuli. Furthermore, there was a 
significant difference in responding to the positive test stimuli of the 
Generalization Test and to the UP as well as the SK stimuli, but no significant 
difference to the SP stimuli. In turn, there was a significant difference in 
responding to the negative stimuli of the Generalization Test and the SP stimuli, 
but no such difference was found in the case of UP and SK stimuli. But again, 
the high variations within all stimulus types and the fact that peck rates of all 
three test types were below average (< 1) warrant caution and do not allow for 
any strong conclusions in terms of differential responding to different types of 
test stimuli. 
 
Table 4. Results of the Picture-Object Recognition Test shown as mean standardized 
response rates (±SD) separately for the two subjects. 
Stimuli Josef (Group No Shell) Daisy (Group No Head) 
SP 1,345 (2,711) 0,798 (0,905) 
UP 0,597 (0,716) 0,626 (0,834) 
SK 0,755 (0,983) 0,424 (0,605) 
Note: SP = seen part stimuli of the Picture-Object Recognition Test; UP = unseen part stimuli; 
SK = skin patches. 
 
Table 5. Results of the Mann-Whitney U Tests (p-values; α = 0,05) comparing 
performance on the three test stimulus types of the Picture-Object Recognition Test (SP, 
UP and SK) with each other and with the performance on the transfer stimuli of the 
Generalization Test. 
Note: gen- = negative transfer stimuli of the Generalization Test; gen+ = positive transfer 
stimuli of the Generalization Test; SP = seen part stimuli of the Picture-Object Recognition 
Test; UP = unseen part stimuli; SK = skin patches. Significant differences are in italics. The 
(most important) comparison between unseen part stimuli and skin stimuli are highlighted in 
pink. 
Subject gen-
/gen+ 
gen-
/SP 
gen-
/UP 
gen-
/SK 
gen+ 
/SP 
gen+ 
/UP 
gen+ 
/SK 
SP/UP SP/SK UP/SK 
Josef 0,0092 0,0003 0,0256 0,0289 0,9961 0,2492 0,2312 0,041 0,1218 0,7639 
Daisy 0,0001 0,0145 0,1317 0,1689 0,1197 0,0152 0,0007 0,3372 0,7677 0,1137 
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Figure 12. Results of the Picture-Object Recognition Test with seen parts, unseen parts 
and skin stimuli. Performance is shown as the arithmetic mean of the mean 
standardized response rates (±SD) obtained in the present experiment (top panel) and 
by Aust and Huber (2006; bottom panel), as well as examples of the individual types of 
test stimuli (right). For comparison reasons the results of the Generalization Test are 
shown as well. For the present study standard deviations among  the stimuli of each 
type are shown, in the case of the Aust and Huber study (2006) standard deviations 
among the subjects of each group are shown. The dashed horizontal line indicates the 
average level of performance. gen- = novel negative stimuli shown in the 
Generalization Test; gen+ = novel positive stimuli shown in the Generalization Test.   
SP = seen part stimuli shown in the Picture-Object Recognition Test; UP = unseen part 
stimuli; SK = skin stimuli.  
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Comparing the two studies, the most obvious — and important — 
difference is that the subjects in Aust and Huber (2006) showed significantly 
higher peck rates to UP than to SK stimuli whereas the subjects in my study did 
not show any such difference, with Josef even showing a slightly reverse 
tendency. Furthermore, Daisy responded below average to all three test 
stimulus types, Josef responded above average only to SP stimuli (and, as 
outlined above, this was due to just one extreme data value). This is in contrast 
to the performance of the birds in Aust and Huber (2006). Although the peck 
rates to SP and UP stimuli lay just slightly above average in the case of Group 
No Head, all birds treated the SP and the UP stimuli as positives rather than as 
negatives, and only peck rates to SK stimuli were significantly lower (i.e., below 
average).  
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5 DISCUSSION 
The experiments by Aust and Huber (2006, 2010) provided evidence of 
pigeons’ ability to recognize the correspondence between pictures and objects at 
a level beyond mere feature discrimination. Namely, they provided evidence of 
representational insight — at least in the sense of transfer of learned feature 
associations from real objects to pictures. It is evident that display of such an 
ability can only be expected if a subject has experience with live representatives 
of the category in question, and, indeed, the results of a number of studies have 
confirmed the crucial role of category familiarity for picture-object recognition 
(e.g., Aust & Huber, 2010; Truppa, 2008; Watanabe, 1997b).  
 
In the present study, the experiment by Aust and Huber (2006) was 
replicated, but with pigeons being trained on a category they had no prior real-
life experience with, namely “snails”. The rationale of the experiment was the 
following. If differential responding to UP (unseen part) and SK (skin) stimuli 
in Aust and Huber was indeed due to representational insight (and thus 
mediated by experience with live humans), the pigeons in the present study 
should display no such difference due to their lack of experience with real 
snails. Such a result would be further — indirect — evidence that pigeons are 
capable of representational insight as long as they are tested with a category 
which they have already gained experience with in real life. At the same time it 
would confirm that the Complementary Information Procedure is an 
appropriate method for investigating picture-object recognition. Indeed, the 
results of the present study differed from the ones obtained by Aust and Huber 
(2006) in several respects. In the following, performance in the three phases of 
the two studies will be compared separately.  
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(1) Discrimination training. Learning speed, i.e., the number of training 
cycles required to reach criterion, was different in the two studies. On average, 
pigeons were faster in learning the discrimination between humans and non-
humans than between snails and non-snails, and two birds failed to learn the 
latter discrimination at all. There are at least two obvious explanations that may 
account for this difference. On the one hand, it is possible that humans and their 
parts are perceptually more salient to pigeons than snails, which could have 
facilitated the extraction of the category-defining features (or memorization of 
individual pictures). On the other hand, faster learning of the “human” than of 
the “snail” category could indeed have been due to a “familiarity effect” (see 
Wilkinson, Specht & Huber, 2010; Specht H.L., 2009: Masterthesis, Vienna 2009). 
This means that real-life experience could have facilitated learning of the 
“human” task as opposed to the “snail” task. In any case, the strategy by which 
the pigeons in the present experiment acquired the discrimination is not 
obvious from training performance. Delayed learning as compared to Aust and 
Huber is compatible with either the need to memorize every instance and its 
contingency individually (rote learning) or difficulties the pigeons encountered 
in abstracting the category-defining features (learning of a perceptual class.) 
Furthermore, there was a difference in learning speed between Group 
No Shell and Group No Head in the present study. Namely, the subjects of 
Group No Head needed significantly fewer cycles to reach criterion (and two 
birds of Group No Shell even failed to learn the task). One possible explanation 
for this difference may be that the shells present in the training pictures of 
Group No Head were more conspicuous for the pigeons and therefore easier to 
recognize than the heads present in the training pictures of Group No Shell. In 
particular, the distinct helix structure of snail shells might have facilitated the 
distinction between Class S and Class NS. In addition, stimuli containing shells 
could have been better discriminable from the background because of their 
distinct colors, which contrasted with the background much more than that of 
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snail bodies (and heads), particularly when the latter were presented on soil or 
on wood. Furthermore the snail figures in the training stimuli of Group No 
Head were, for the most part, bigger than those presented to Group No Shell 
(due to the fact that shells were, on average, larger than heads), which might 
also have differentially affected target detectability in the two groups.  
Overall, we may assume that snail shells made a potentially better 
category-defining feature than the snail-bodies or heads. This finding has a 
parallel in the studies by Aust and Huber (2006; 2010), who found that human 
heads were more important for the formation of an appropriate and 
comprehensive representation of “humans” than were hands. Correspondingly, 
the pigeons of Group No Hands learned the discrimination between humans 
and non-humans faster than Group No Head.  
 
(2) Generalization Test. Only two birds of the present study (one of each 
group) pecked significantly more on novel snail than on novel non-snail stimuli 
in the Generalization Test, and one of them did so only after additional training. 
All other birds showed just a non-significant tendency to classify the novel 
stimuli correctly. The most parsimonious explanation to account for the 
significant transfer displayed by the two successful birds would be in terms of a 
generalization mechanism based on perceptual similarity of test stimuli with 
individually memorized training pictures (i.e., exemplar learning). 
Alternatively, they may have abstracted from the training stimuli one or more 
category-specific features and recognized them also in the novel pictures. But 
overall, the pigeons’ ability to transfer their knowledge from training stimuli to 
novel instances was strongly limited in the present study, which indicates 
substantial deficits in the birds’ ability to form an appropriate and 
comprehensive target representation. Rather, it suggests that classification was 
bound to a considerable extent (although not fully) to the appearance of 
individually learned category instances. In the study by Aust and Huber (2006), 
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by contrast, all pigeons showed good transfer to new people-present and 
people-absent pictures, which indicates that they had formed a representation 
of (incomplete) humans. Presumably, they did not learn the stimuli by rote (at 
least not on a pixel-by-pixel basis), but abstracted the category-relevant 
features. The same reasons that may have accounted for the differences in 
learning speed between the two studies could have been responsible for 
different performance in the Generalization Test, namely, differences in either 
perceptual conspicuousness (or distinctiveness) between humans and snails, or 
in the birds’ real-life experience with the trained categories. 
 
(3) Picture-Object Recognition Test. The crucial test in order to examine 
representational insight was the Picture-Object Recognition Test. The results 
revealed that both birds classified the unseen parts (UP) of a snail as negative 
stimuli, and no difference in responding was found between true (previously 
unseen) snail parts (UP) and arbitrary (non-representative) patches of snail skin 
(SK).  
This suggests that the pigeons’ lack of experience with live 
representatives of the category “snail” may have caused them to treat the 
previously unseen parts of the snail, namely the head or the shell, respectively, 
like negative stimuli. This finding is in sharp contrast to the results of Aust and 
Huber (2006), who found that pigeons treated pictures of unseen parts of 
humans as positives and pecked at them significantly more than to non-
representative skin patches. It was concluded that the pigeons had based their 
responding on representational insight, and the different outcome of the 
Picture-Object Recognition Test of the present study lends further credit to this 
assumption. 
Interestingly, only the No Shell pigeon (Josef) showed a significant 
tendency to peck more at SP than at UP stimuli. The No Head pigeon (Daisy) 
did not respond significantly more to shells (i.e., the seen parts) than to heads 
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(i.e., the unseen parts). One possible explanation for the different performance 
of the two pigeons on their SP stimuli could be that variability in the 
appearance of snail heads may have been lower than variability in the 
appearance of snail shells. On closer inspection, the heads shown in the Picture-
Object Recognition Test looked very similar to the ones presented in training 
regarding their color and their shape, whereas the shells varied strongly in 
shape and/or color. The different response rates emitted to seen parts by the No 
Shell and the No Head pigeon could thus have been due to differences in the 
perceptual similarity between the two groups’ positive training stimuli and the 
corresponding seen parts stimuli.  
Thereby, the No Shell pigeon (Josef) may have used a combination of 
both the surface properties of skin (i.e., texture and color cues) and the 
characteristic shape of the head. Regarding Daisy, the No Head pigeon, the 
possibility may be considered that she used some kind of a “compound” 
feature to classify the training pictures, that is, the shell in combination with the 
headless body. This means that during training she might have learnt that only 
figures consisting of both a trunk and a shell are rewarded. Thus, shells alone 
(SP stimuli) may not have been classified significantly more as positives than 
the UP stimuli because – for the pigeon – they lacked crucial information, 
namely, the trunk. An alternative explanation for Daisy’s results may be that 
she learned the training task by exclusively attending to the shells and that 
these were, by accident, more similar to the shells shown in the Generalization 
Test than to the ones of the SP pictures in the Picture-Object Recognition Test. If 
so, she could have passed the Generalization Test, but would have failed on the 
SP stimuli (and of course, also on the UP and the SK stimuli, which contained 
no shells at all). Although I was very careful in choosing the pictures of the 
different tests and stimulus types, this possibility cannot be entirely excluded. 
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Comparing the three test stimulus types of the Picture-Object 
Recognition Test with the test stimuli of the Generalization Test reveals the 
following. In the case of the No Shell pigeon (Josef) there were significant 
differences between the negative pictures of the Generalization test and all 
three test stimulus types of the Picture-Object Recognition Test but no 
significant differences between the positive pictures of the Generalization Test 
and either of the three stimulus types. Hence, one may be tempted to assume 
that Josef treated all test stimulus types (SP, UP and SK) rather like positive 
than like negative training stimuli. However, it must not be forgotten that, in 
absolute terms, response rates were low (< 1) and/or contaminated by high 
standard deviations, which demands extreme caution. Similarly, the significant 
difference between seen parts and unseen parts seems to indicate that the 
pigeon did make a difference between “familiar” and “unfamiliar” parts of a 
snail, but again, one should be careful not to over-interpret these results for the 
outlined reasons. 
 
Regarding the No Head pigeon (Daisy) there was a significant difference 
between the negative pictures of the Generalization Test and the SP stimuli of 
the Picture-Object Recognition Test, but not between the positive pictures of the 
Generalization Test and the SP stimuli which suggests that she, as well, may 
have recognized something “familiar” in the SP pictures (although there was no 
significant difference to the UP stimuli). There were also significant differences 
between the positive pictures of the Generalization Test and the UP and SK 
stimuli which indicates that the latter were treated more like negatives than the 
SP stimuli. But as with Josef, the large differences in response rates within the 
individual stimulus types demand caution in interpreting also Daisy’s 
performance. 
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In summary, the results of the current thesis showed that the 
Complementary Information Procedure (Aust & Huber, 2006) yielded different 
results when used with an unfamiliar object class than with a class that pigeons 
have real-life experience with. The most important finding of my study was 
that, in contrast to the pigeons in Aust and Huber, the two birds that 
accomplished the Picture-Object Recognition Test of the present experiment did 
not respond differently to UP and SK stimuli. Therefore, my findings indirectly 
confirm the assumption that information about real objects can be transferred to 
pictures of objects of the same category (Aust & Huber, 2006; 2010). That is, 
pigeons are able to recognize the correspondence between parts of a real object 
and the equivalent parts in pictures at a level beyond mere feature 
discrimination. 
But although the present work seems to justify the assumptions made by 
Aust and Huber, one has to keep in mind that only two subjects were tested in 
the (most important) Picture-Object Recognition Test, and, moreover, these two 
showed slightly different behaviour. Furthermore, the large variations in peck 
rates within the individual stimulus types (SP, UP and SK) entail that these 
results may, at best, reflect some tendencies. Finally, it must be kept in mind 
that generalization to novel category instances was strongly limited in all birds 
and that response rates of Daisy and Josef to all test stimulus types in the 
Picture-Object Recognition Test — including SP — were quite low. This seems 
to point to a general problem of the pigeons to properly learn and transfer the 
discrimination between snail and non-snail pictures (i.e., to form an appropriate 
and comprehensive target representation). Whether these difficulties were 
entirely due to familiarity effects (and thus indirect support of the notion of 
representational insight) seems doubtful, at least. Rather, the pigeons’ problems 
with the “snail” category may have had a perceptual basis, and this could easily 
have interfered with the effects of (lacking) picture-object recognition. For all 
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these reasons, one has to be very cautious not to over interpret the present 
results. 
 
It is beyond dispute that further studies are needed to clarify at which 
cognitive level pigeons are able to relate pictures to the real world. To this end, 
investigations with more subjects would be of interest for future research. 
Furthermore, it would be of importance to investigate which parts of a snail are 
actually crucial for categorization. To examine this, pigeons could be trained to 
discriminate snail versus non-snail pictures, whereby the snails are left intact, 
i.e., without modifying or removing parts of them. Afterwards they could be 
tested for transfer to pictures of isolated snail parts. Another possibility to 
further test the conclusions drawn from the results of the present study would 
be to repeat this experiment with another category the pigeons are not familiar 
with, like, for example, fish or horses. Finally, it would be interesting to apply 
the Complementary Information Procedure to various other nonhuman species 
and investigate how they will manage to solve Picture-Object Recognition 
Tasks. All these lines of research may eventually contribute to a better 
understanding of how pigeons and other nonhuman species process pictures 
and may thus be relevant to a wide range of studies on animals’ visual 
cognition. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Supporting Information 
 
Table 6. Mean standardized response rates obtained in the Generalization Test 
(columns gte- and gte+) and in the Picture-Object Recognition Test (columns sp, up and 
sk) by Aust and Huber (2006).  
Note: _nha = subject(s) of Group Nohands; _nhe = subject(s) of Group Nohead; _all = subjects of 
both groups; gte+ = positive transfer stimuli in the generalization test; gte- = negative transfer 
stimuli in the generalization test; sp = seen part in the picture-object recognition test; up = 
unseen part in the picture-object recognition test; sk = skin in the picture-object recognition test; 
SD = standard deviations of the values from the preceding column. 
Subject gte- SD gte+ SD sp SD up SD sk SD 
B6_nha 0,559 0,706 1,585 0,772 1,175 0,821 0,963 0,796 0,512 0,612 
T4_nha 0,750 0,539 1,500 0,592 1,315 0,929 1,184 0,587 1,112 0,867 
T9_nha 0,883 0,749 1,445 0,691 1,296 0,607 1,395 0,557 1,181 0,549 
T11_nha 0,690 0,615 1,490 0,535 1,466 0,833 1,240 0,688 0,966 0,790 
T48_nha 0,877 0,581 1,369 0,514 1,299 0,777 1,333 0,791 0,882 0,789 
B24_nhe 0,626 0,639 1,274 0,516 1,082 0,781 1,174 0,633 0,957 0,868 
B9_nhe 0,652 0,615 1,374 0,834 0,999 0,922 1,045 0,776 0,613 0,728 
T42_nhe 0,858 0,556 1,400 0,519 1,077 0,519 1,107 0,450 1,071 0,728 
T59_nhe 0,878 0,674 1,368 0,550 1,057 0,848 0,953 0,675 0,664 0,736 
T61_nhe 0,784 0,707 1,177 0,623 1,171 1,045 0,883 0,644 1,114 0,763 
mean_nha 0,752 0,136 1,478 0,079 1,310 0,103 1,223 0,167 0,931 0,262 
mean_nhe 0,759 0,116 1,318 0,093 1,077 0,062 1,033 0,117 0,884 0,232 
mean_all 0,756 0,119 1,398 0,117 1,194 0,147 1,128 0,169 0,907 0,235 
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Table 7. Results of the Mann-Whitney U Tests (p-values; α = 0,05) obtained by Aust 
and Huber (2006) comparing performance on the three test stimulus types of the 
Picture-Object Recognition Test (sp, up and sk) with each other and with the 
performance on the transfer stimuli of the Generalization Test. 
Note: _nha = subject(s) of Group Nohands; _nhe = subject(s) of Group Nohead; gen- = negative 
transfer stimuli of the Generalization Test; gen+ = positive stimuli of the Generalization Test; sp 
= seen part of the Picture-Object Recognition Test; up = unseen part; sk = skin patches. 
Significant differences are in italics. The (most important) comparison between unseen part 
stimuli and skin stimuli are highlighted in pink. 
 
Subject gen-
/gen+ 
gen- 
/up 
gen- 
/sp 
gen- 
/sk 
gen+ 
/up 
gen+ 
/sp 
gen+ 
/sk 
sp/up sp/sk up/sk 
B6_nha ≤ 0,0001 0,0026 ≤ 0,0001 0,7622 ≤ 0,0001 0,0066 ≤ 0,0001 0,0821 ≤ 0,0001 ≤ 0,0001 
T4_nha ≤ 0,0001 ≤ 0,0001 0,0003 0,0277 0,0033 0,0287 0,0004 0,8431 0,1185 0,0927 
T9_nha 0,0014 0,0002 0,0019 0,0155 0,5739 0,1372 0,0188 0,2487 0,1994 0,0182 
T11_nha ≤ 0,0001 ≤ 0,0001 ≤ 0,0001 0,1076 0,0400 0,4195 ≤ 0,0001 0,0839 ≤ 0,0001 0,0077 
T48_nha 0,0002 0,0040 0,0065 0,6279 0,5041 0,4390 ≤ 0,0001 0,7914 0,0005 0,0002 
B24_nhe ≤ 0,0001 ≤ 0,0001 0,0027 0,0479 0,2335 0,1815 0,0028 0,4715 0,2139 0,0122 
B9_nhe ≤ 0,0001 ≤ 0,0001 0,0047 0,0837 0,2207 0,0993 0,0052 0,4715 0,2139 0,0122 
T42_nhe 0,0001 0,1260 0,0481 0,1726 0,0043 0,0039 0,0027 0,7105 0,4345 0,2018 
T59_nhe 0,0008 0,6046 0,3984 0,0437 0,0009 0,0086 ≤ 0,0001 0,6400 0,0012 0,0011 
T61_nhe 0,0052 0,3879 0,0936 0,0177 0,0202 0,3759 0,5005 0,2568 0,7047 0,0648 
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Figure A1. Examples of positive training stimuli (S+) that were shown to Group No 
Head. 
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Figure A2. Examples of positive training stimuli (S+) that were shown to Group No 
Shell. 
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Figure A3. Examples of negative training stimuli (S-) that were shown to both subject 
groups. 
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Figure A4. Examples of positive test stimuli (S+) that were shown to Group No Head in 
the Generalization Test. 
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Figure A5. Examples of positive test stimuli (S+) that were shown to Group No Shell in 
the Generalization Test. 
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Figure A6. Examples of negative test stimuli (S-) that were shown to both subject 
groups in the Generalization Test. 
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Figure A7. Examples of test stimuli showing heads that were shown to both subject 
groups in the Picture-Object Recognition Test. 
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Figure A8. Examples of test stimuli showing shells that were shown to both subject 
groups in the Picture-Object Recognition Test. 
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Figure A9. Examples of test stimuli showing patches of snail skin of arbitrary size and 
shape that were shown to both subject groups in the Picture-Object Recognition Test. 
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SUMMARY 
Since the pioneering study by Herrnstein and Loveland (1964) it is 
known that pigeons are able to classify a variety of different objects into 
categories (e.g., on the basis of perceptual similarity) and that they are also able 
to generalize to novel class members. However, successful categorization does 
not necessarily mean that a subject also understands what a pictorial stimulus 
actually represents. It is hard to tell, whether the tested subjects have really 
understood that a depicted object “stands for” the real object (DeLoache, 1995; 
2000). The question is, whether animals, just like humans, can recognize the 
relation between 2D-pictures and their 3D-referents. 
The “Complementary Information Procedure” (CIP) introduced by Aust and 
Huber (2006) allowed for a distinction between representational insight and less 
advanced mechanisms of picture-object recognition. Pigeons trained to 
discriminate between pictures of (incomplete) humans and pictures without 
humans subsequently responded more to pictures of parts of a human figure 
that had been absent in the training stimuli than to pictures of non-
representative patches of human skin. This suggests that the birds recognized 
the correspondence between the (incomplete) human figures shown in the 
training stimuli and live human beings, i.e., they recognized the missing parts 
shown in the test as representatives of real body parts.  
In the current study I used the CIP to test the pigeons on a perceptual 
category they had no prior experience with, namely “snails”. The birds were 
trained to discriminate between pictures of incomplete snails (i.e., bodies 
without the head or the shell, respectively) and pictures showing something 
else. Two out of eight subjects showed generalization to novel snail and non-
snail pictures and could subsequently be subjected to the critical test for 
picture-object recognition. There, they were presented with pictures of the 
previously missing parts (UP) as well as with non-representative skin patches 
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(SK). As a control, they were also shown pictures of parts that had already been 
present in the training stimuli (SP). In contrast to the study by Aust and Huber 
(2006) the pigeons showed no difference in responding to UP and SK stimuli 
(i.e., peck rates to both types were similarly low). This indicated that they were 
not able to recognize the missing parts as belonging to the snail body, 
presumably because of their lack of experience with live representatives of the 
category snail. In conclusion, the present experiment supports the assumption 
that pigeons are able to transfer information about associations among real-life 
object parts to pictures thereof (Aust & Huber, 2006; 2010), that is, they are able 
to recognize the correspondence between familiar (or known) objects and 
pictures at a level beyond the discrimination of simple perceptual features.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Seit der Pionierarbeit von Herrnstein & Loveland (1964) weiß man, dass 
Tauben in der Lage sind, eine Vielfalt von verschiedenen Objekten in ihre 
entsprechenden Kategorien einzuordnen (z. B. auf der Grundlage von 
Ähnlichkeit) und auch imstande sind, auf neue Kategoriemitglieder zu 
generalisieren. Jedoch bedeutet erfolgreiche Generalisierung nicht 
notwendigerweise, dass ein Versuchstier auch versteht, wofür ein bildlicher 
Stimulus steht. Es ist schwer zu sagen, ob die Versuchstiere wirklich verstehen, 
dass ein abgebildetes Objekt für das echte Objekt steht (DeLoache, 1995; 2000). 
Die Frage ist, ob Tiere, ebenso wie Menschen, die Beziehung zwischen 
zweidimensionalen Bildern und ihren dreidimensionalen Referenzobjekten 
erkennen können. 
Die “Complementary Information Procedure“ (CIP), eine Methode, die von 
Aust und Huber (2006) eingeführt wurde, erlaubt eine Unterscheidung 
zwischen „repräsentativer Erkenntnis“ (representational insight) und weniger 
anspruchsvollen Mechanismen der Bild-Objekt-Erkennung. Tauben, die 
trainiert wurden, zwischen Bildern mit (unvollständigen) Menschen und 
Bildern ohne Menschen zu unterscheiden, reagierten im darauffolgenden Test 
stärker auf Bilder von zuvor fehlenden Körperteilen als auf Bilder von nicht 
repräsentativen Hautteilen. Dies weist darauf hin, dass die Vögel einen 
Zusammenhang zwischen den (unvollständigen) Körperteilen und echten 
Menschen erkannten, d. h. sie erkannten die fehlenden Teile im Test als 
Vertreter von echten Körperteilen.  
In der vorliegenden Studie verwendete ich die „Complementary 
Information Procedure“ (CIP) mit einer Kategorie, mit der die Tauben keine 
vorherige Erfahrung hatten, nämlich der Kategorie „Schnecke“. Die Tiere 
wurden trainiert, zwischen Bildern von unvollständigen Schnecken (d. h. ohne 
Kopf oder Haus) und Bildern ohne Schnecken zu unterscheiden. Zwei der 
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insgesamt acht Versuchstiere zeigten auch Generalisierung zu neuen 
Schnecken- und Nichtschneckenbildern und konnten daher im kritischen Test 
für Bild-Objekt-Erkennung geprüft werden. Bei diesem wurden sie sowohl mit 
Bildern der zuvor fehlenden Teile (UP) als auch mit Bildern nicht 
repräsentativer Hautteile (SK) konfrontiert. Als Kontrolle wurden ihnen auch 
Bilder mit bereits aus dem Training bekannten Teilen (SP) gezeigt. Im 
Gegensatz zu der Studie von Aust und Huber (2006) zeigten die Tiere keinen 
Unterschied in der Reaktion auf die UP- und SK-Bilder (d. h., ihre Pickraten 
waren bei beiden Bildtypen ähnlich niedrig). Dies deutet darauf hin, dass die 
Tiere aufgrund ihres Mangels an der Erfahrung mit lebenden Vertretern der 
Kategorie „Schnecke“ nicht in der Lage waren, die fehlenden Teile dem 
Schneckenkörper zugehörig einzuordnen. 
Die Ergebnisse dieses Experiments bestätigen also die Annahme, dass 
Tauben in der Lage sind, Information über Assoziationen zwischen den Teilen 
echter Objekte auf Bilder der selben Objekte zu übertragen (Aust & Huber, 
2006; 2010), d. h. Tauben sind fähig, den Zusammenhang zwischen Teilen eines 
bekannten Objekts und den entsprechenden Teilen auf einem Bild jenseits der 
Unterscheidung einfacher perzeptueller Eigenschaften zu erkennen. 
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